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APPUCATION OF RULES OF EVIDENCE TO FACT-FINDING
BOARDS
URBAN R. MILLER*
B ASED upon the experience of mankind, law comprehends
neither scientific certitude nor objective truth. But in com-
promising on an approximation of fact, the law is accountable
to a complexity of method unknown to the seeker after pure
truth. The fickle uncertainties of human nature explain the at-
tainment of legal certitude only by means of exhaustive series
of rules and exceptions to rules. So the moralist, the scientist,
and the logician point the jurist to the anomaly that despite his
elaboration of method for determining fact, usually the issue in
dispute is not the truth or falsity of facts, but the more sub-
stantive question of truth or falsity of conclusions.'
This complex method of proof, with its rules, exceptions to
rules, and exceptions to exceptions is the product of the jury-
trial method of fact determination.2 But like all institutions that
live on accumulation of precedent, the sin of self-exploitation
has encumbered its efficiency.
The establishment of fact-finding bodies to improve upon the
lay jury system came with the great modern social and eco-
nomic changes. The twelve good men and true of the vicinage
were not uniformly orientated to the new type of problems. Un-
adaptability of the temper of the common law system of proof
to the solution of social problems, and the consequent distrust
of the jury system, resulted in modification by the creation of
specialized fact-finding tribunals which are fulfilling an ever-
increasing demand.
Specialized fact-finding bodies have replaced the jury in two
respects. First, we have fact-finding juristic experts, such as
referees and special masters, who are adjuncts of the courts.
Second, we have administrative tribunals separated from the
courts in their fact-finding duties, but designed to relieve the
courts from consideration of a great mass of technical detail.8
Williams. Arizona. Member of Iowa and Arizona Bars.
1 Carl McFarland, "Administrative Agencies in Government and the Effect
Thereon of Constitutional Limitations," 20 A.B.A. Jour. 612.
2 J. B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (Little,
Brown, & Co., Boston, 1898), Chs. 4-6, pp. 180, 266, 270, 509.
8 Administrative tribunals may be divided into four general classes: (1) Those
with jurisdiction over purely technical matters, (2) those with jurisdiction over lay
subjects, (3) those with jurisdiction over semi-technical subjects, (4) those with
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It is, however, to the latter that this discussion is devoted, since
it is those tribunals which have departed most markedly from
the legal rules of evidence, and threaten to found a new method
of fact ascertainment from which the anachronisms and cob-
webs of the common law will be discarded.
4
When we approach consideration of the application of the jury-
trial rules of evidence by our modern fact-finding bodies, we
find the origin and policy of such rules obscured by historical
precedents of the common law. Therein lies the fundamental
distinction already suggested, since at common law the ascer-
tainment of fact has been inseparably identified with the lay
jury system.5 In the early history of administrative law, the
natural order was to observe the legal rules of evidence.0 As
a result this historical anomaly has long existed, and has only
recently begun to give way to socialized concepts. The lawyer
is trained in the uncompromising absolutism of the jury-trial
rules; and so the orthodoxy of precedent yields but stubbornly
to the pressing needs of the times which demand a practical
distinction between common-sense truth and legal truth,' and
the consequent further creation of business-like organizations
designed to adjudicate complicated and technical questions in a
business way.8
When we bring the question of policy down to date, we must
arrive at a compromise between two diametrically opposed
views, either of which goes to the extreme of arbitrariness and
caprice in the hands of its most ardent advocates. The legalistic
semi-political, or a fusion of judicial and legislative, jurisdiction over questions of
public policy.
4 Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 113 Kan. 217, 214
P. 797 (1923). But note the following: "And the trouble also lies in creating an
administrative tribunal which is complaining witness, ex parte prosecutor, grand
jury, inter partes prosecutor, jury and judge, to issue an order affecting the conduct
of a citizen's business." Frank. B. Fox, "What about Administrative Tribunals?"
21 A.B.A. Jour. 376. However, consistency in reasoning would recognize a distinc-
tion between administrative tribunals which have jurisdiction over questions in-
volving only private parties and administrative tribunals which have jurisdiction
over questions in which a private party and the public are involved. See discussion
by F. A. Ross, "The Applicability of Common Law Rules of Evidence in Proceedings
before Workmen's Compensation Commissions," 36 Harv. L. Rev. 263 at 265.
5 Berkeley Peerage Cases, 4 Camp. 401 at 415, 171 Eng. Rep. 128 at 135.
6 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.), I, § 4b, p. 24.
7 P. G. Phillips, "A Practical Method for the Determination of Business Fact," 82
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 230.
8 F. A. Ross, "The Applicability of Common Law Rules of Evidence in Proceedings
before Workmen's Compensation Commissions," 36 Harv. L. Rev. 263.
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view is that the jury-trial system of rules, founded upon caution
born of experience, cannot be dispensed with, either constitu-
tionally or with any degree of safety. It is contended that ex-
pedient judicial review would be impossible without resort to the
criterion by which probative fact is evaluated, and that there-
fore procedure that is workable in one kind of tribunal is work-
able in another.1"
The other is the lay view. Rules of exclusion, it is said, are
irrational in fact determination." And so its proponents point
to the success with which juvenile courts, domestic relations
courts, workmen's compensation commissions, and the Inter-
state Commerce Commission have conducted their inquiries
without adhering to the legal rules of evidence. 2 With these
bodies rules of exclusion are rare; only rules deemed funda-
mental and essential to due process are observed.
13
There is much to recommend both views, and probably as
much to condemn them. The lay view is based upon the fal-
lacious generalization that since certain tribunals have dispensed
justice without regard to the legal rules, all tribunals can do
likewise. 4 But conditions differ within the various kinds of
tribunals, whereas the jury-trial rules represent the accumula-
tion of human experience for all time and conditions. And yet
the jury-trial rules have become so technical that reversals by
appellate courts are tending to become the rule rather than the
exception. Despite the extreme over-conservatism in the mat-
ter of admission of evidence, false verdicts are every day being
rendered and allowed to stand. 5
9 Although written for another question, no bit of philosophy is more pertinent
than Justice Holmes's line in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 at 349, 41
S. Ct. 506 at 507, 65 L. Ed. 963 (1921): "Upon this point a page of history is worth
a volume of logic."
10 Wigmore, Evidence (2 ed.), I, § 4b, p. 28. 11 Ibid., p. 27.
12 Bartlett, "The New Justice," 126 Atlantic Monthly 296.
13 Svarney v. U.S., 7 F. (2d) 515 (1925).
14 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.), I, § 4b, p. 29.
15 With characteristic frankness, Dean Wigmore has said: "A third thing to
remember is that the jury-trial system of Evidence-rules cannot be imposed upon
administrative tribunals without imposing the lawyers upon them also; and this
would be the heaviest calamity. The complex mass of Evidence-rules cannot be
applied except by technically trained lawyers; and, furthermore, many of these
technical lawyers will belong to the over-technical type. No one can wish that the
petty snarling contentiousness over technicalities of trial tactics, so typical of jury-
trial, should be transferred to the administrative tribunals. And yet, how can the
system be transferred without transferring the only persons who can use it?
Sermonize as we may on the wisdom of the system in the abstract, it cannot be
used in the abstract; and in the concrete it reeks of futile professional contentious-
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As a whole, the jury-trial rules of evidence serve their pur-
pose in guiding an ill-assembled group of inexperienced jury-
men, whereas administrative tribunals are presided over by
men who are experts in the particular field of inquiry. Hence,
while accepting the system as a whole, we cannot but brand as
irrational, obstructive, and overly cautious certain individual
rules. This difficulty may be dissolved by transplanting the sys-
tem in toto, minus its objectionable features, from its native
habitat to the new field of administrative law.
Attempt at solution of these preliminary questions leads us
toward a compromise somewhere between the two extremes of
being shackled by out-worn rules and being bound by no rules
at all. This compromise the New York courts sought in the
classic case of Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Company," wherein
the residuum rule was promulgated. In this decision it was
held that, at the hearing, the administrative tribunal need not
be bound by the jury-trial rules. It could thus summarily dis-
regard all the legal rules of exclusion and admit evidence freely
and liberally. But those rules would control the mental process
of weighing the great volume of evidence so freely received, and
require that in it there be sufficient competent probative evi-
dence to sustain the findings.17
At first glance the liberalizing tendency of this rule appears
to be a step in the right direction. Its ultimate effect, however,
is to arrive back at the starting point, inasmuch as it requires
elimination from consideration of the very sort of proof upon
which the myriad affairs of the world are daily conducted. It
ness. Yet one of the universally desired objects in vesting the powers of decision
over new industrial and commercial problems in modern administrative boards was
to avoid hampering them with the technical methods enforced by the judges in
jury-trials; the language of the legislative enactments demonstrates this plainly.
A survey of the practice in different States before such boards gives the impression
that their failure or success in this respect may be fairly measured by the extent to
which the professional assistance of lawyers has or has not continued to be necessary
before them as formerly before the jury-courts. Certainly, then, to impose the
Evidence-rules on administrative tribunals will inevitably mean the imposition also
of the handicap of a professional body of lawyers to conduct the practice." Wigmore,
Evidence (2d ed.), I, § 4b, pp. 30, 31.
16 155 N.Y.S. 1 (1915), reversed with two judges dissenting, 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E.
507 (1916).
17 See also Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 253 U.S. 117, 40 S. Ct. 466. 64
L. Ed. 810 (1920); U.S. v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 44 S. Ct. 565, 68 L. Ed.
1016 (1924); Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. B. & M. Co., 289 U.S. 266,
53 S. Ct. 627, 77 L. Ed. 1166 (1933), where it was said:, "A finding without substantial
evidence to support it-an arbitrary or capricious finding--does violence to the law."
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still virtually requires the fact-finding body to use the jury-trial
rules as a criterion; and it reiterates and readopts the specious
assumption upon which the evil of the legal rules rests-that
there is some reliable and logical relation between the observ-
ance of the rules and the accuracy of the finding. The rule goes
even further afield. It says in effect that the evidence which
conforms to the legal requirements is credible, whereas that
which is not so blessed is not credible.18 The paramoint purpose
of the rule appears to be to allow the tribunal to weigh all evi-
dence carefully for competency before weighing it for probative
worth.
Fortunately, as a compensating development, the spirit of
compromise appears more often to separate irreconcilable prin-
ciples of substantive law, and constantly influences our conten-
tious system of procedure. Hence, the failure of the compromise
on the residuum rule to provide a workable system should not
deter us from seeking other compromises between the over-
conservatism of the legal rules and modern social and economic
needs. An ideal would be one most frugal of the wisdom of
the common law, and at the same time open to adoption of
rules dictated by our changing world. Obviously, such a system
would be predicated upon the legal rules as a whole, with modi-
fication and simplification of rules that are now antiquated and
purposeless.
The difficulty lies not alone with the rules themselves, but in
their abuse as well.19 This is an unfortunate result of the spirit of
our contentious method of procedure, in the use of which the
bar is sometimes shortsighted enough to forget that an advo-
cate's duty is to see that justice is done, not to win ingloriously
at the expense of the law's shortcomings. Behind that is what
has been so aptly termed "undue servitude to the bondage of
precedent" and a "fetish of immutability,"2 for a rule once
promulgated is thenceforth supreme law, to be applied doggedly
without critical review and regardless of policy. Objecting coun-
sel is not required to show, or even avow, before a rule is in-
voked, that an actual violation of right will result from its non-
enforcement. 2 1 Magnification of unimportant error into reversi-
18 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.), I, § 4b, pp. 32-4.
19 Ibid., § 8a, p. 127. 20 Ibid., § 8a, p. 117.
21 P. G. Phillips, "A Practical Method for the Determination of Business Fact,"
82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 230 at 232.
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ble error renders the law of evidence as a whole entirely too
rigid.22
The remedy is partially suggested by the statement of the de-
fect. A rearrangement of our conception of the administration
of justice so as to subordinate the rule of law per se to the higher
exigencies of the situation is the inevitable suggestion.23 Thus,
greater discretion in the trial or fact-finding body as to applica-
bility of rules of evidence to the issues in dispute would lead to
that practical flexibility requisite to the administration of jus-
tice. Too often in the hands of a reviewing tribunal a concrete
situation full of human actualities becomes a mere abstract
proposition of law. Every opportunity should be afforded the
lower or administrative court to apply its own correctives and
to neutralize then and there for all time the effect of improper
evidence.
When we come to a consideration of the specific question of
the extent to which fact-finding boards should be bound by rules
of evidence, we see more concretely the need for liberalization
and restatement of such rules. The difficulty of proof incident
to the subjects assigned these bodies necessitates an approach
that inquires first, what facts are needed, and second, how the
rules of evidence may be adopted to that end.24 In no event, of
course, can the constitutional requisites of due process be ig-
nored.2" Likewise, any thought of curtailing or encumbering the
process of judicial review of questions of law is too far contrary
to deep-seated tradition to be lightly tolerated." To these tests,
therefore, must any attempted solution of the general problem
be subjectedY
22 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.), I, § 8a, pp. 128 et seq.
23 Fronsdahl v. Civil Service Commission of Des Moines, 189 Iowa 1344, 179 N.W.
874 (1920).
24 F. A. Ross, "The Applicability of Common Law Rules of Evidence in Proceed-
ings before Workmen's Compensation Commissions," 36 Harv. L. Rev. 263 at 265;
P. G. Phillips, "A Practical Method for the Determination of Business Fact," 82
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 230 at 232.
25 U.S. ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 44 S. Ct. 54, 68 L. Ed. 221 (1923);
Svarney v. U.S., 7 F. (2d) 515 (1925); Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.), I, § 4a, p. 22.
26 Even the prerogative remedies of injunction and mandamus are available in
judicial review. State ex rel. Brewster v. Mohler, 98 Kan. 465, 158 P. 408 (1916).
But compare the following: "One of the most persuasive arguments against a too
generous employment of the right to a judicial review is the fact that courts are
not equipped to review findings of fact in many technical fields." M. Rosenberry,
"Administrative Law and the Constitution," 23 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 32 at 42 (1929).
27 Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. B & M. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 53 S. Ct.
627, 77 L. Ed. 1166 (1933); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed. 598
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Fact-finding boards are, or should be, first of all composed of
experts in the field of inquiry. Continued experience that comes
from long and secure tenure of service enhances expertness, and
enables the board to determine questions of fact accurately on
much less or different evidence than is necessary to move an
unskilled jury past first presumptions. 8
The choice then lies somewhere within (1) freedom from all
rules of evidence, (2) freedom from the restraint of purely tech-
nical rules of evidence,29 and (3) freedom from rules which are
today patently irrational.
Although the first choice finds ready acceptance here and
there, it is impossible;3 ° we are unwilling to legislate away the
accumulation of centuries of experience, even for the exigencies
of administrative law.3 1 In the language of the average judge
and lawyer, we find a great deal of truth: "If these boards and
commissions are going to hold court, let them conduct them-
selves as courts." So the proposal can be discarded summarily
in favor of a compromise.
Involved in the next plan is the prerequisite determination of
what, if any, are purely technical rules of evidence. Is the
rule against the admission of hearsay evidence a purely techni-
cal rule? This rule is maligned by more exceptions than prob-
ably any other rule of law, which suggests to many students that
(1932), restricting the right of review to questions of law. But compare this state-
ment: "Where the legislature has created these commissions and given them final
power to pass on questions of fact, with a review by the courts on questions of law
alone, courts should be most reticent in upsetting the finding of the administrative
where there is any fact produced, tending to support the finding of the commission."
F. A. Ross, "The Applicability of Common Law Rules of Evidence in Proceedings
before Workmen's Compensation Commissions," 36 Harv. L. Rev. 263 at 270. Com-
pare also the suggestion that a purely administrative appellate tribunal may well
serve the purpose. Carl McFarland, "Administrative Agencies in Government and
the Effect Thereon of Constitutional Limitations," 20 A.B.A. Jour. 612.
28 F. A. Ross, "The Applicability of Common Law Rules of Evidence in Proceedings
before Workmen's Compensation Commissions," 36 Harv. L. Rev. 263 at 265.
29 In Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Industrial Commission, 352 InI. 405, 186 N.E. 140 (1933),
it was held that although the decision of an arbitrator or commission must be
founded on legally competent evidence, a mere disregard of the common law tech-
nical rules governing the method of production and hearing of evidence and the
examination of witnesses is not sufficient to set aside such an award.
80 Attempts at interpretation and application of statutes freeing administrative
commissions from statutory and common law rules of evidence have ended in much
the same way as the Knickerbocker Ice Co. case. See discussion of these cases by
F. A. Ross, "The Applicability of Common Law Rules of Evidence in Proceedings
before Workmen's Compensation Commissions," 36 Harv. L. Rev. 263 at 276-84.
31 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.), I, § 4b, pp. 34, 35, wherein he analyzes the proposal
for administrative tribunals. Compare, however, § 8a, p. 124, where he discusses the
same procedure for the judiciary.
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it must be more technical and arbitrary than any other rule, or
that it is the only purely technical rule. It has been held, how-
ever, that the hearsay rule is not a technical rule, but one that
is grounded upon sound principles of the common law.2 The
bases for the decisions so holding are as follows: (1) The absence
of the sanction of an oath, (2) no opportunity afforded the ad-
verse party for cross-examination, (3) opening up immaterial
collateral issues.
With temporary disposition of this preliminary question on
the hearsay rule, we come to consideration of fundamental rules
which are deemed as not technical but partially irrational in
their application to adjudication of modern problems.
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
The rule that the burden of proving the allegation is on the
proponent, and that the burden of going forward with the proof
shifts back and forth, is one of the most logical and intrinsically
sound rules of adjective law. In this field the situation is always
the same, in every kind of court and every kind of case. In
the mental process of weighing the proof against abstractions
even expert fact-finders are sometimes confused and at a loss to
know how to proceed under artificial extraneous instructions. So
also a misconception results when rules of exclusion prevent the
plaintiff from offering evidence toward discharge of the bur-
den. The consequent injustice is improperly attributed to the
rule of burden of proof, rather than to the rules of exclusion.
Simple direct mental weighing is the process by which liberty
and property are daily affected in our varied human relations
and is the process upon which all historical truth is predicated.3
Likewise, the application of presumptions, other than those
that assist in defining burden of proof, result in confusion. Some
of them actually seek to shift the burden of proof at the very out-
set to the defendant. 4 For instance, many workmen's compen-
sation acts provide that in an action against an employer who has
rejected the act, the presumption shall be that the injury was
82 Englebretson v. Industrial Accident Commission, 170 Cal. 793, 151 P. 421 (1915);
Employers' Assurance Corporation v. Industrial Accident Commission, 170 Cal. 800,
151 P. 423 (1915); Pacific Coast Casualty Co. v. Pillsbury, 171 Cal. 319, 153 P. 24
(1915); Reck v. Whittlesberger, 181 Mich. 463, 148 N.W. 247 (1914).
33 Wigmore, Evidence (2d. ed.), I, § 8a, p. 146.
34 F. A. Ross, "The Applicability of Common Law Rules of Evidence in Proceed-
ings before Workmen's Compensation Commissions," 36 Harv. L. Rev. 263 at 271-4.
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the result of the employer's negligence, and that he must there-
upon assume the burden of proof to rebut the presumption.8
5
HEARSAY AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Probably the point at which there is greatest divergence be-
tween the more everyday method of fact ascertainment as ex-
emplified in the law of evidence of other countries, and the
Anglo-American system of evidence, is in the value of hearsay
evidence.8 6  Our law has been very jealous of secondary evi-
dence and most insistent upon the primacy of evidence produced
by rules of exclusion. With seventeenth century perspective our
jurisprudence followed our determination to prevent abuses that
had been suffered under the early common law, and we accord-
ingly adopted the abstract theory that the more difficult the
burden of proof or the burden of going forward with the proof,
the less likelihood of the law disturbing the status quo.
When we have devised a competent substitute for cross-exam-
ination of witnesses, we shall have laid the foundation for
changes in the hearsay rule as thoroughgoing as the most lib-
eral critic could desire. The right to cross-examination is funda-
mental, inalienable. It is construed in every bill of rights; it
is the one trial weapon wielded with an approach to a maximum
of scientific precision. So it is not likely to be discarded for any
reapplication of the rule against hearsay. But with all the re-
sources that unrestricted use of cross-examination puts at one's
command, secondary evidence need not be excluded entirely
but can be admitted to stand or fall on its own probative merit.
Dean Wigmore would retain this vital feature of the hearsay
rule, but would have the rule modified: (1) By liberalizing its
application to former testimony and depositions; (2) by admit-
ting relevant statements made by persons now deceased;88 (3)
85 Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 37 S. Ct. 255, 61 L. Ed. 679 (1917). In this case
it was held that it is within the province of a state to give effect to the salutary
purpose of a Workmen's Compensation Act by setting up presumptions which affect
the burden of proof, as long as such presumptions are not unreasonable or conclu-
sive of the rights of the parties. Accord: Industrial Commission v. Hammond,
77 Colo. 414, 236 P. 1006 (1925); Shea v. North-Butte Mining Co., 55 Mont. 522, 179
P. 499 (1919).
86 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.), I, § 8a, p. 127.
87 The Ottawa v. Stewart, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.), 269, 18 L. Ed. 165 (1863); Svarney v.
U.S., 7 F. (2d) 515 (1925); Wigmore, Evidence, III, § 1367, pp. 26-30.
88 Accord: Shell Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 36 Cal. App. 463, 172 P. 611
(1918); State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Accident Commission, 195
Cal. 174, 231 P. 996 (1924).
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by removing all exceptions to the dying declaration rule; (4) by
allowing proof by simple official certificate; (5) by removing the
intricate network of exceptions to statements of mental or physi-
cal condition; (6) by allowing narration of spontaneous exclama-
tions to be made in such a manner that suspicion does not sur-
round every word; (7) by permitting qualified witnesses to nar-
rate in direct conversational language without the exclusion of
essential details by the rule against hearsay.3 9
These suggestions by the great master of the law of evidence
are truly constructive. Although offered primarily for the pur-
poses of jury-trial, need we go further for the purposes of ad-
ministrative law?
With similar caution we have guarded our rights from the mu-
tations of circumstantial evidence. It was not until we recov-
ered from the shock caused by the departure of administrative
tribunals from the accepted jury-trial rules that we realized
fully that circumstantial evidence could carry unerring convic-
tion. The courts sought to check the threatened evil of such a
deviation from precedent, by the doctrine that the conviction
produced by circumstantial evidence must not be the result of
mere guess, conjecture, or surmise" "of a choice between two
views equally compatible with the evidence."'" Indefinite as
this guide may seem to be, it is nevertheless the restatement of
basic common sense. It still leaves a wide field for liberality
in adjective law. Hearsay evidence fortified by circumstantial
evidence should certainly be trustworthy. No suggestions of
chance coincidence can throw such a situation into the realm
of improbability.'
Ex PARTE INVESTIGATIONS AND TESTIMONY
Autoptic Proference
The case of the arbitrator who was chastised by the court
for seeking extra-legally to determine the marketability of mer-
chandise by offering it for sale in the market, has become a
classic example of degeneration of our adjective law. This is what
39 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.), I, § 8a, pp. 136-9.
40 Peoria Railway Terminal Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 352, 116 N.E. 651
(1917); Peoria Cordage Co. v. Industrial Board of Illinois, 284 Ill. 90, 119 N.E. 996
(1918).
41 Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Industrial Commission, 352 IMI. 405, 186 N.E. 140 (1933).
42 Johnston v. Payne-Yost Construction Co., 292 Pa. 509, 141 A. 481 (1928).
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actually happened in Stefano Berizzi Company v. Krausz.3 By
the doctrine of this case we are led to the conclusion that, in
some courts at least, the pendulum has swung too far from the
ancient common law rule that the testimony of the parties to
the controversy was incompetent. The rule in this case implies
that the only competent evidence is that adduced at the behest
of the litigating parties themselves. Too often the scales are
balanced back and forth on the same issue, while the court, the
jury, the commission, the arbitrator-the fact-finding function-
ary-sits helplessly by, unable to determine the facts by pertin-
ent matters which neither party is willing to hazard in evi-
dence. 4 If such a sortie is indulged in, it must indeed be a clan-
destine proceeding. And yet there are countless instances where
even an approximation of truth is difficult without an outside in-
vestigation. It is the method of historians and scientists. The
right of the parties to cross-examine on any evidence received
in this manner would be amply protective.
Autoptic proference of an object or of a place to a jury out of
court is permissible only under the most restricted conditions. A
strange commentary on our law is that when a jury is taken to
view a place in question, it is expected to see only that which
it is told to see .4  But in the case of a trained observer making
an impartial investigation of all pertinent facts for an expert
fact-finding body of which he is a member, there is no need for
narrow rules excluding from the physical senses facts which
are competent and material in consideration of human problems
by other agencies. The successful manner in which domestic re-
lations courts, juvenile courts, and the Interstate Commerce
Commission, for instance, have used evidence gathered through
ex parte investigations indicts mere unreasoning opposition, and
recommends this type of evidence to our socialized tribunals.
46
48 239 N.Y. 315, 146 N.E. 436 (1925).
44 The Stefano Berizzi Company case is discussed by P. G. Phillips, "A Practical
Method for the Determination of Business Fact," 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 230 at 232 et seq.
45 "If a sensible man wants to make sure whether a window is broken or a house
burned down, he puts on his hat and goes out and sees for himself what the fact is.
But our Courts seem to regard a jury's view as if it were an act which would expose
jurors to an infectious disease or a moral contamination." Wigmore, Evidence (2d
ed.), I, § 8a, p. 135.
46 But cf. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. U.S., 264 U.S. 258, 44 S. Ct. 317, 68 L. Ed. 667
(1924); United States v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 44 S. Ct. 565, 68 L. Ed.
1016 (1924). In these cases it was held that facts within the knowledge of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, but not formally put in evidence in the particular
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There is a great difference between haphazard ex parte investi-
gation and the methodical assembling of evidence by trained
experts.
Ex parte oral testimony by the ordinary witness is, however,
another thing. It is submitted that such procedure runs afoul
of the best of the rule against hearsay,47 and is violative of our
due process clauses.4s In some respects competent oral testi-
mony subjected to cross-examination is at the best only second-
ary evidence. By means of autoptic proference a thing speaks
for itself, not through the incongruities of human communica-
tion.
Another aspect of the question was considered in Kaw Valley
Drainage District v. Missouri Pacific Railway Company.49 Here
the Kansas court went even farther than the most forward-
thinking students of administrative law had theretofore antici-
pated and expressed the view that administrative tribunals are
policy-forming bodies-that by liberating them from the legal
rules of evidence, their quasi-judicial pronouncements can be
made accountable to popular will. The court said:
Another contention of defendant is that it did not receive due considera-
tion from the plaintiff's board before the order for the removal of the
bridge was issued, and that the members of the board made the order
pursuant to pre-election promises that they would not tolerate any bridge
across the river having more than two piers. The circumstances were
unusual .... In any matter of such general interest as flood protection
in Kansas City, it would be asking entirely too much of mere laymen to
keep their minds open and uncommitted on such matters likely to come
before them later for official consideration. Lawyers and judges trained
in the art of jurisprudence, which requires a suspension of the judgment
until all sides of a controversy have been fully considered, can do this;
but if such high standards of mental neutrality are absolutely essential
to qualify for membership in administrative boards, the whole system of
administering government functions by boards and commissions of lay-
men will fail. The remedy for such prejudgments is not wanting, however.
The redress of such grievances is usually taken care of when the courts
are called on to test the reasonableness of the official orders of these
boards.
proceeding, will not support an order. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S. Ct.
285, 76 L. Ed. 598 (1932).
47 Carstens v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 572, 158 P. 218 (1916); Bereda Manufacturing
Co. v. Industrial Board of Illinois, 275 IMI. 514, 114 N.E. 275 (1916); Ruda v. Industrial
Board of Illinois, 283 Ill. 550, 119 N.E. 579 (1918); Gauthier v. Penobscot Chemical
Fiber Co., 120 Me. 73, 113 A. 28 (1921); Earle's Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. v.
Walker, [1917] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 54.
48 Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 40 S. Ct. 566, 64 L. Ed. 1010 (1920).
49 99 Kan. 188 at 210, 101 P. 937 at 947 (1916).
APPLICATION OF RULES OF EVIDENCE
EXPERT WITNESSES AND OPINION EVIDENCE
Theoretically the opinion of an expert is supposed to be well
nigh unimpeachable. And yet perversions of the use of expert
opinions have become so common that we have lost a great deal
of respect for this type of evidence. Rare indeed is the con-
tested case in which the testimony of experts is given, that the
fact-finding body is not obliged either to find directly to the con-
trary of the testimony of one or more experts, or to reconcile
their extremely antipodal views.5" When experts differ so great-
ly on the issue, the tendency must be toward not only a loss of
respect for the lay testimony adduced, but loss of respect for
the very proceeding itself. Only a fact-finding body composed
of experts in the field of inquiry, and which is at liberty to pro-
ceed with its own independent investigation, is able to evaluate
properly the conflicting opinions of experts.
While Dean Wigmore would retain the requirement that an
expert be qualified by special experience, he would at the same
time allow the ordinary lay witness to state an inference, or
describe his impression, based upon personal observation of a
nontechnical matter.51 Almost any person can form and ex-
press an adequate opinion on safety, care, negligence, reason-
ableness, character, sobriety. Such an opinion on a minor non-
technical issue, if bona fide, should be of effective assistance to
a fact-finding body of technicians. However, it is sometimes
rather difficult to believe that this sort of opinion evidence would
not soon go the unfortunate way of expert opinions. Lay witness-
es are no less susceptible to the human frailty of bias and prej-
udice than are experts.
In no event, however, should liberalization of rules of evidence
amount to a disregard of substantive law.52 While it is some-
times difficult to determine whether a rule is one of substantive
or adjective law, as, for example, in the case of the parol evi-
dence rule, tests of basic purpose should be applied. The
50 A case within the personal knowledge of the writer is too illustrative of the
point to be kept. In this case, in which the issue was the value of a corner lot, five
so-called realty evaluation experts testified-two for the plaintiff and three for the
defendant. Their opinions as to the value of the lot in question ranged from $1,600
to $27,500! Almost any unbiased man in town-laboring man, business man, or pro-
fessional man-could have, either from personal knowledge or upon a little investi-
gation, given a more accurate opinion.
51 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.), I, § 8a, pp. 140-2.
52 Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Industrial Commission, 352 Ill. 405, 186 N.E. 140 (1933).
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simplest of these is that if the rule is considered by a court in
reaching its ultimate decision, it is one of substantive law, but
that if it merely prevents oral testimony from being admitted,
it is a rule of adjective law.53  That administrative tribunals
should interpret or construe independently more than a modi-
cum of substantive law is a suggestion too far-fetched to require
present consideration. Their role is expediency in procedure.5
The English practice in arbitration proceedings of providing for
court instruction of arbitrators on the law to be followed in
their decisions on the facts, contains some assurance that the
law as administered by the arbitrators will be the law of the
land. 5 Why, then, should any fact-finding body in discovering
facts be handicapped by rules of exclusion, and yet be allowed
full play in making decisions on substantive law?
53 P. G. Phillips, "A Practical Method for the Determination of Business Fact,"
82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 230 at 243-4.
54 "On the other hand, law and administration are to some extent antagonistic
institutions of government. The one is interested in regularity and the protection
of private rights, the other in getting something done. The judges are trained in
the tradition of the common law, while administrators deal in highly technical
matters of comparatively recent origin." Carl McFarland, "Administrative Agencies
in Government and the Effect Thereon of Constitutional Limitations," 20 A.B.A.
Jour. 612 at 613.
55 Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmidt & Co., [1922] 2 K. B. 478.
